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PAYMENT PROTECTION INSURANCE (PPI) MISSELLING: 
SOME LESSONS FROM THE UK 
 
ANDROMACHI GEORGOSOULI 
 
*** 
The misselling of Payment Protection Insurance (“PPI”) is a 
longstanding problem in the UK.  The Treating Customers Fairly (“TCF”) 
initiative was introduced to tackle this problem but, despite its 
sophisticated inception, its effectiveness has been limited.  This Article 
canvasses the main features of TCF as a management-based approach to 
regulation and highlights its initial appeal.  Against this backdrop, it draws 
on the recent UK experience with recurring instances of PPI misselling to 
offer an account of the principal causes of its shortcomings in the retail 
financial sector.  It argues that the perceived failure of this regulatory 
approach may be attributed to the following three factors: (i) the 
rulification of TCF; (ii) several shortcomings of the existing data resource 
management; and (iii) the absence of a system of credible deterrence to 
support the Financial Conduct Authority’s attempts to be proactive and to 
inflict cultural change at regulated firm level.  The Article concludes with a 
summary of key lessons that may be drawn from the UK experience. 
*** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Financial misselling describes selling practices in the retail 
financial sector that exploit the customer’s reliance on the expertise, 
advice, and professionalism of the provider of the financial product or 
service in question.  Typically, it is a deliberative strategy to sell financial 
products that customers do not need.1 Financial misselling has a long 
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history in the UK.  In the 1990s, misled workers pulled out of company 
final-salary pension schemes and enrolled in plans that were linked to stock 
market returns.2 During the same period, mortgage endowment policies and 
Card and Identity Protection Insurance (“CIPI”) were missold to 
consumers.3 The misselling of Payment Protection Insurance (“PPI”) has 
perhaps been worse.4 It started off in the 1980s and has been recurring ever 
since.5 In view of its magnitude, this Article will focus on the regulatory 
response to PPI misselling as a case study. 
                                                                                                                                      
an earlier version of this Article and to Matteo Angelini for his assistance. Any 
errors are my own. 
1 Practices of predatory lending in the US are similar but not identical to financial 
misselling in the UK. A major difference concerns the locus of these phenomena. The 
majority of predatory lending has been associated with the subprime sector. In the 
UK, financial misselling occurs in the mainstream retail financial sector. See Richard 
V. Ericson & Aaron Doyle, The Institutionalization of Deceptive Sales in Life 
Insurance: Five Sources of Moral Risk  ¸46 BRIT. J. CRIM. 993, 993–1010  (explaining 
the impact on the life insurance sector by financial misselling in the US through 
empirical studies); Nicole L. Fuentes, Defrauding the American Dream: Predatory 
Lending in Latino Communities and Reform of California’s Lending Law, 97 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1279, 1279–1335 (2009) (discussing predatory lending in the United States); 
SYNOVATE LTD., CONSUMER MARKET STUDY ON ADVICE WITHIN THE AREA OF 
RETAIL INVESTMENT SERVICES – FINAL REPORT (2011), available at 
http://e.c.europa.eu/consumers/archive/rights/docs/investment _advice_study_en.pdf 
(providing investment advice to 27 member states of the EU).  
2 Nearly one million of them eventually won compensation totaling £11.8 
billion. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., NATIONWIDE AVC & PENSION SCHEME INTEREST RATE 
FINAL RETURNS, available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/fsavc-
review/fsavc-bs-returns.pdf. 
3 Card and Identity Protection Policyholder to Claim Compensation by 30 
August 2014, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Mar. 3, 2014), 
http://www.fca.org.uk/news/compensation-for-card-and-identity-protection-
policyholders; see also FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ENDOWMENT MORTGAGE 
COMPLAINTS: FEEDBACK ON CP75 AND ‘FINAL’ TEXT (2001), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps75.pdf. 
4 See Luis Lobo-Guerrero, Uberrima Fides, Foucault, and the Security of 
Uncertainty, 26 INT’L J. SEMIOTICS L. 23, 31–32 (2013) (explaining the practice of 
PPI misselling and its history in the UK). 
5 Julia Black & Richard Nobles, Personal Pensions Misselling: The Causes and 
Lessons of Regulatory Failure, 61 MOD. L. REV. 789, 789–820 (1998) (pointing out that 
misselling is one of the key drivers that led to reform of the system of financial 
regulation in the late 1990s); James Pickford, PPI Dominates as Consumer Complaints 
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PPI provides insurance against the risk that a borrower will be 
unable to maintain credit repayments for specified reasons as, for example, 
when he is unable to work or due to an accident.6 PPI is not suitable for 
everyone.  Suppose, for instance, that X is applying for a loan in order to 
buy a car.  He is perfectly healthy, he is educated, and his family can help 
him out financially if he finds himself temporarily out of work in the 
future.  He does not need a PPI, but he is forced to buy PPI.  For example, 
he is told that it is better to purchase PPI, because otherwise he will have to 
pay an increased interest for the loan that he is applying for. In other 
instances, it may be the case that PPI goes together with a personal loan (or 
a mortgage) as a compulsory component, but customers are never alerted of 
that fact.  
The predecessor of the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) on 
matters of consumer protection and conduct of business – the Financial 
Services Authority (“FSA”) – made PPI misselling an early priority when it 
assumed responsibility for the regulation of general insurance 
intermediation in 2005.7 Initially, the FSA tried to work with the industry. 
The Treating Customers Fairly initiative (“TCF”) stood at the epicentre of 
the regulator’s approach and it was launched in 2006 with the aim of 
intensifying the FSA’s attempt to attune business culture with the delivery 
of fair treatment for customers as part of its consumer protection mandate.8  
The TCF is sophisticated in its inception, but thus far has proved to 
be ineffective in deterring instances of financial misselling.  Between 2006 
and 2008, selling practices in the retail financial sector revealed poor 
suitability checks and training, ineffective systems and controls, and 
                                                                                                                                      
Hit Record High, FIN. TIMES (May 19, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/24610976-
df6d-11e3-a4cf-00144feabdc0. html#axzz38gfKumLG. 
6 See Ellis Ferran, Regulatory Lessons from the Payment Protection Insurance 
Mis-selling Scandal in the UK, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 247, 250 (2012) 
(providing various working definitions of PPI); Final Notice from Fin. Servs. Auth. 
to Lloyds TSB Bank plc and Bank of Scotland plc (Feb. 15, 2013),  available at 
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/fca/documents/final-notices/ lloyds-banking-
group.pdf. 
7 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., TREATING CUSTOMERS FAIRLY AFTER THE POINT OF 
SALE 7 (2001), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp7.pdf; Clive 
Briault, Managing Dir. Retail Markets, Fin. Servs. Auth., Treating Customers 
Fairly: Progress and Future Plans at the FSA Treating Customers Fairly 
Conference (Oct. 4, 2005) (transcript available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2005). 
8 See infra pp. 8–12 (discussing the nature of TCF). 
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inadequate provision of information to customers.  There were also 
problems with the resolution of disputes, the taking of disciplinary action, 
and delays in the provision of financial redress.  For example, it was not 
until the second half of 2011 that large-scale redress of past misselling 
began.  Things do not seem to have improved.9 In July 2014, a new set of 
complaints about “another PPI scandal” hit the news this time challenging 
the capabilities of the new regulator – the Financial Conduct Authority – to 
do a better job than its predecessor.10 As it transpired, more than 60,000 
small businesses were missold fixed-rate business loans to protect them 
against interest rate changes without being informed that a swap was added 
to the transaction or that the swap could possibly have the reverse effect.11 
These introductory remarks give rise to the following question: 
Why is TCF failing to deliver?  In this Article, I will attempt to offer an 
answer to this question.  I will start with a brief account of the legal 
underpinnings and the nature of the TCF.  Against this background, I will 
try to demonstrate that the shortcomings of this approach may be attributed 
to a combination of the following three factors: (a) the rulification of TCF 
namely a regulatory strategy that was originally conceived as informal, 
flexible, and responsive in nature; (b) certain flaws in the data resource 
management that is currently in place to facilitate the electronic reporting 
of PPI related data and other conduct of business and consumer protection 
issues; and (c) the absence of a system of credible deterrence to back up 
proactive intervention that aims to inflict cultural change and to attune 
business ethics with the delivery of public policy objectives – here, that of 
fair treatment for customers. 
These parameters do not exhaustively account for all of those 
market, institutional, legal, behavioural, and cognitive conditions that 
inhibit the effective implementation of TCF.  Poor standard setting, 
capture, creative compliance, the implementation of a regime of corporate 
governance regulation that falls short of providing rewards for the delivery 
of good quality of services to retail financial customers, and the level and 
nature of competition in the relevant industry are only some of a plethora of 
other considerations that could be enlisted as factors that circumscribe the 
effectiveness of TCF.  However, in view of space constraints, the purpose 
of this Article is not to offer a comprehensive account of all the causes of 
                                                                                                                                      
9 See infra pp. 14–24 (examining the main causes). 
10 Adrian Quine, Banks Face New Mis-selling Scandal, BBC NEWS (Jul. 3, 
2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-28037608. 
11 Id.  
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the TCF failings, but to discuss those of them that, in the opinion of the 
author, have not received the attention they deserve.  
 
II.  THE REGULATION OF PPI: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Pre-crisis, the Financial Services Authority was the single UK 
mega-regulator with a wide range of powers at its disposal.  Consumer 
protection was one of the four FSA statutory objectives under the Financial 
Services and Markets Act (“FSMA”) 2000.12 The other three were market 
confidence, financial stability, and the reduction of financial crime.13 The 
Financial Services Act 2012 changed this.  As of April 2013, the FSA was 
abolished and replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) and 
the Prudential Regulation Authority (“PRA”), the latter being a subsidiary 
of the Bank of England.14 The FCA and the PRA are focus-specific with a 
separate set of statutory objectives to deliver.  They are operationally 
independent and at least on paper of equal institutional standing.  The 
strategic objective of the FCA is to ensure that financial markets function 
well.15 To this effect, the FCA is responsible for consumer protection, 
market integrity, and competition in the interests of consumers.16 The PRA 
is the primary micro-prudential regulator and part of its mandate is to offer 
a helping hand to the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England 
in delivering its financial stability objective.17 
Despite their distinct institutional standing, the statutory objectives 
of the PRA and the FCA are not exclusive to the regulatory agency that 
they are attached to.  This is particularly evident in relation to the 
regulation of the insurance sector for the purposes of policyholder 
                                                                                                                                      
12 See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 5 (U.K.). 
13 Id. at §§ 1(3), 6, 26(1)(a), 3, 3A, 9 (showing that the fifth objective, “public 
awareness,”  § 4, was eventually omitted by virtue of amendments that were 
introduced under §§ 2(3) and 26(3) of the Financial Services Act, 2010 
(Commencement No. 1 and Transitional Provision) Order 2010, S.I. 2010/2480, 
2)). 
14 Andromachi Georgosouli, The FCA-PRA Coordination Scheme and the 
Challenge of Policy Coherence, 8 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 62, 62–65 (2013). 
15 Financial Services Act, 2012, c. 1, § 1B(2) (U.K.) (amending Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000). 
16 Id. at §§ 1B(2), 1(C), 1D, 1E, 3 (promoting consumer protection, market 
integrity, and competition). 
17 Id. at § 2B (“The PRA’s general objective”). 
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protection.  Granted that policyholders are a sub-group of consumers, one 
would expect that their protection would fall within the remit of the FCA in 
view of the FCA’s statutory objective of consumer protection.  However, 
the UK legislator opted for a more complex route.  The Financial Services 
Act 2012 entrusts the protection of policyholders to the PRA and not the 
FCA, presumably to highlight the fact that the protection of this special 
group of consumers is a matter of prudential regulation calling primarily 
for solvent and sound insurance firms.18 Nevertheless, the FCA 
complements the work of the PRA.  The tackling of PPI misselling, in 
particular, falls within the competence of the FCA, given its primary 
responsibility on matters of conduct of business, part of which is the fair 
treatment of customers. 
 A combination of primary and secondary legislation alongside 
common law doctrines on contract, agency, and tortuous liability comprises 
the regulation of PPI.  Until recently, the regulation of consumer credit fell 
under the province of the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) under the 
Consumer Credit Act (“CCA”) 1974.19 Credit agreements financed PPI 
premiums under CCA, while the writing and marketing of the policies were 
regulated under the FSMA, causing unnecessary overlaps and 
inconsistencies.20 As of April 2014 and in light of amendments to the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which were introduced by the 
Financial Services Act 2012, the FCA is now the regulator of consumer 
credit, taking over the responsibilities of the OFT and thus bringing 
consumer credit firms under its consumer and conduct of business 
mandate.21 
                                                                                                                                      
18 Id. at § 2C (“Insurance objective”). 
19 See Consumer Credit Act, 1974, c. 39, §§ 1(1), 3 (U.K.). 
20 See Consumer Credit Act, 2006, c. 37 §§ 9(4), 20(1), 60, 61, 54 (U.K.). See 
generally Consumer Credit (Total Charge for Credit), 2010, S.I.  2010/1011, 4 
(U.K.) (TCC Regulations); Consumer Credit (Agreements), 2010, S.I. 2010/1014 
(U.K.); Financial Service Act (Consumer Credit), 2013, Stat. R. & O. 2013/1882 
(U.K.) (transferring regulatory powers from the Office of Fair Trading to the 
Financial Conduct Authority, which became responsible for consumer credit as of 
April 2014); see also Eva Lomnicka, The Future on Consumer Credit Regulation: 
A Chance to Rationale Sanctions for Breaches of Financial Services Regulatory 
Regimes, 34 COMPANY LAW., 13, 13 (2013) (documenting the problems with the 
previous regime). 
21 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., CONSUMER CREDIT SOURCEBOOK (2014), available 
at http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/CONC (setting out the main rules for those 
firms providing consumer credit). 
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Not unlike the FSA, the FCA has a wide range of disciplinary and 
enforcement powers at its disposal.22 Some of them are discussed in further 
detail later.23 For the time being and as a general remark, it is important to 
note that the FCA has, inter alia, the power to (a) impose administrative 
fines, (b) withdraw authorisation and permissions, (c) apply for injunctions 
and restitution orders, and (d) prosecute certain criminal offences.24 Of 
particular relevance to the tackling of PPI misselling is new section 138D 
(former section 150) establishing a civil law remedy for the aggrieved party 
to seek compensation,25 sections 225 to 233 setting out the role of the 
Financial Ombudsman Service (“FOS”) in handling consumer complaints 
and in granting compensation where appropriate, and section 404 on 
consumer redress schemes.26 To ensure that the regulator’s disciplinary 
action will be visible enough to have an impact on the conduct of market 
actors, new section 391 (1ZB) also enables the FCA to publish information 
about warning notices in certain cases.27 On paper, this looks like a 
significant departure from the previous regime, under which the earliest 
that the FSA could publish details of a disciplinary matter was when it 
issued a final notice at the conclusion of a case (e.g., after the Tribunal had 
reached a decision).  In reality, the effect of this amendment must not be 
blown out of proportion.  A careful reading of the relevant provision 
reveals that the regulator must, inter alia, consult with the person to whom 
the notice is given.  In addition, the FCA’s power to publish information 
                                                                                                                                      
22 See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, Part XI (amended 2012) 
(U.K.), for the disciplinary powers of the FCA. See id. at Part XIV for the powers 
of FCA to gather information and conduct investigation.   
23 See infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
24 See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION GUIDE (2013), 
available at http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/enforcement-information-
guide.  
25 Only “private persons” are eligible to make use of this statutory civil law 
remedy. See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Rights of Actions), 2001, 
S.I. 2001/544 (U.K.); Titan Steel Wheels Ltd. v. The Royal Bank of Scot. PLC, 
[2010] EWHC (Comm) 211, [76] (Eng.) (finding a corporation did not qualify to 
bring an action under § 150 of the FSMA because it was acting in the course of 
business); Figurasin v. Cent. Capital Ltd., [2014] EWCA (Civ) 504 (Eng.). 
26 These are to be read in conjunction with the Consumer Redress Schemes 
Sourcebook (CONRED) of the FCA Handbook. See generally FIN. CONDUCT 
AUTH., CONSUMER REDRESS SCHEME SOURCEBOOK (CONRED) (2014), available 
at http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/CONRED.  
27 See Financial Services Act, 2012, c. 21, § 37 (U.K.). 
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about warning notices is restricted by virtue of section 391(6), which 
prohibits the FCA from publishing information when the publication would 
be (a) unfair to the person against whom that action was proposed to be 
taken; (b) prejudicial to the interests of consumers; or (c) detrimental to the 
stability of the UK financial system. 
Secondary legislation adds a further layer of detail with regard to 
the conduct of business in the retail financial sector and the procedural 
aspects of supervision, compliance, and enforcement.28 Of particular 
relevance here is the Insurance Conduct of Business Sourcebook 
(“ICOBS”).  This constitutes a more concrete statement of the FCA 
Principles for Businesses and comprises the main body of rules and 
guidance that underpins the conduct of business of insurance services 
providers.29 Alongside general and transitional provisions, the ICOBS sets 
out, inter alia, the details regarding the identification of, and provision of 
advice to, clients (chapter 5), product information, including PPI 
requirements (chapter 6), cancellation rights (chapter 7), and claims 
handling (chapter 8).  Further, and with respect to the selling of PPI, firms 
are under the legal obligation to establish the eligibility of the customer in 
question (ICOBS, 5.1.2R) and to bring to the customer’s attention the 
importance of reading the policy contract documentations prior to the 
expiry of the period of cancellation (ICOBS, 6.4.5R).30 Finally, the FCA 
Handbook contains a comprehensive set of rules and guidance on dispute 
resolution and complaints handling, including the handling of PPI 
complaints.31 
 
III.  THE NATURE OF TCF AND THE GROUNDS THAT 
INFORMED ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Under Principle 6 (customers’ interests) of the FCA Principles for 
Businesses, “a firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers 
                                                                                                                                      
28 See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., INSURANCE: CONDUCT OF BUSINESS 
SOURCEBOOK ch. 5–6 (2014), available at http://media.fshandbook.info/ 
content/full/ ICOBS.pdf. 
29 The Principles for Businesses are set out in PRIN 2.1.1 and they are 
identical to the FSA High Level Principles for Business. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., 
PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS § 2.1.1 (2014), available at http://fshandbook.info/ 
FS/html/FCA/PRIN/2/1.pdf. 
30 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 28, ch. 5–8. 
31 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: COMPLAINTS §§ 1.3, 3, app. 3 
(2014), available at http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/DISP. 
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and treat them fairly.”  In pursuance of this Principle, TCF asks the 
industry to work out for itself what practices guarantee fair treatment for 
clients in a manner that is attuned to the policy goals and priorities of the 
regulator. These goals are encapsulated in the following six TCF 
outcomes:32 
“Outcome 1: Consumers can be confident that they are dealing with 
firms where the fair treatment of customers is central to the corporate 
culture.  
Outcome 2: Products and services marketed and sold in the retail 
market are designed to meet the needs of identified consumer groups and 
are targeted accordingly.  
Outcome 3: Consumers are provided with clear information and are 
kept appropriately informed before, during, and after the point of sale.  
Outcome 4: Where consumers receive advice, the advice is suitable 
and takes account of their circumstances.  
Outcome 5: Consumers are provided with products that perform as 
firms have led them to expect, and the associated service is of an acceptable 
standard.  
Outcome 6: Consumers do not face unreasonable post-sale barriers 
imposed by firms to change product, switch provider, submit a claim, or 
make a complaint.” 
TCF is not a new set of secondary legislation.  It is a guidance that 
reflects key elements of the UK regulator’s strategy in the retail financial 
sector.  The outcomes that firms are expected to deliver are communicated 
through informal means as, for example, Policy Statements (“PS”) and 
“Dear CEO Letters.”  From this, however, it does not follow that this 
otherwise informal guidance has no bearing on the taking of enforcement 
action.33 Indeed, the six TCF outcomes enlisted above do not stand in 
isolation from the FCA Handbook, despite the fact that strictly speaking 
they do not form part of secondary legislation.34 For all intended purposes, 
                                                                                                                                      
32 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., TREATING CUSTOMERS FAIRLY – A GUIDE TO 
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION (2007), available at http://www.fca.org.uk/ 
firms/being-regulated/meeting-your-obligations/fair-treatment-of-customers.pdf.  
33 Ferran, supra note 6, at 259 (characterizing the TCF outcomes as “non-
binding guidance”). 
34 John Tiner, Address at the Ins. Sector Conference (Sept. 21, 2006), 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/ 
2006/0320_jt.shtml. 
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they echo the FCA Principles for Businesses.35 Further, they are linked to a 
range of other Handbook provisions in the sense that they constitute a set of 
more concrete benchmarks against which compliance is to be assessed.  
Arguably, TCF can be described as a management-based approach 
to regulation.36 It combines elements of performance-based and process-
oriented strategies whereby the focus is on processes, systems and controls, 
internal management, and the monitoring of performance in delivering 
tangible outcomes pertaining to the fair treatment of customers.  Quite 
often, the management-based, performance-based, and process-oriented 
approaches to regulation are used interchangeably in the literature, but for 
systematic purposes, it is important to highlight some key differences.  In 
the case of management-based regimes, firms are expected to develop plans 
and monitoring systems for the delivery of certain public policy objectives.  
Accordingly, compliance is assessed in terms of whether the implemented 
systems and controls are fit for purpose.  Process-oriented regulation 
focuses on the firms' engagement in a process of comprehensive self-
evaluation, design, and management of their business.  Finally, 
performance-based regulation constitutes an extension of principles-based 
regulation in the sense that it focuses on the attainment of outcomes, 
leaving the regulated population to decide how best these can be achieved.  
Similar to the approach that was adopted by its predecessor, the 
FCA’s intervention takes the form of a combination of proactive and 
reactive measures.  The purpose of proactive measures is to mitigate the 
risk that the customers of a specific firm will not be treated fairly.  Reactive 
intervention typically takes the form of disciplinary and enforcement 
action, the aim of which is primarily to provide some sort of redress to the 
aggrieved party and to deter future misconduct.  Over the years, there has 
been a clear preference for proactive intervention and industry engagement 
(e.g. through road shows, working with the industry, mystery shopping, 
etc.), while enforcement has been generally regarded as a measure of last 
resort.  
                                                                                                                                      
35 These were formerly labelled as the FSA High-Level Principles of Business. 
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH.,  supra note 29. 
36 See Andromachi Georgosouli, The FSA’s Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) 
Initiative: What is so Good About it and Why it May Not Work, 38 J.L.S. 405, 410 
(2011); Cary Coglianese & David Laser, Management-Based Regulation: 
Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
691, 693–694 (2003) (considering the distinction between management-based, 
process-oriented and performance-based approaches). 
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Specifically, in pursuing its proactive intervention agenda, the UK 
regulator has the power to take a range of intrusive measures with respect 
to issues such as the allocation of resources and competences, the nature of 
staff training, and the kind of remedial action that may be deemed 
necessary in the event of a customer complaint.  Moreover, the regulator 
has a comprehensive toolkit to attune business culture and patterns of self-
governance to match TCF targets.37 For example, the “product life-cycle” is 
a regulatory device that guides firms in their attempt to align their TCF 
strategy with the priorities and the expectations of the FCA from the early 
stages of planning and production through to after-sale services.  Other 
regulatory measures that work in a similar fashion include the FCA's 
Culture framework, which intends to help firms build TCF into their 
culture, and Management Information (“MI”), the purpose of which is to 
make it easier for senior managers to keep things in perspective when 
managing data, while making it possible for the FCA to get a more accurate 
view of the firms' capacity to deliver TCF outcomes.38 
The regulator’s reactive intervention essentially reflects its strategy 
of compliance and enforcement.  The case of Alliance & Leicester 
(“A&L”) is a classic example not least because it set the tone of the 
regulator’s policy of compliance and enforcement that is still implemented 
today.39 A&L was ordered to pay the biggest fine for serious failings in the 
selling of PPI pre-crisis.40 However, A&L also agreed to implement a 
customer contract programme overseen by third-party accountants.  Under 
                                                                                                                                      
37 Alliance and Leicester to Pay £7 million Fines for PPI Failings, FIN. SERVS. 
AUTH. (Oct. 7, 2008), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/ 
communication/pr/2008/115.shtml; Georgosouli, supra note 33, at 415–16. 
38 TCF Culture, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Apr. 5, 2013), 
http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-regulated/meeting-your-obligations/fair-
treatment-of-customers/Culture; FIN. SERVS. AUTH., TREATING CUSTOMERS 
FAIRLY – TOWARDS FAIR OUTCOMES FOR CONSUMERS (2006), available at 
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/ fca/documents/fsa-tcf-towards.pdf. 
39 Georgosouli, supra note 36, at 416. 
40 A&L was fined £7,000,000. Post crisis, financial firms were made to pay 
much higher fines. See Press Release, Fin. Cond. Auth., FCA Fines Lloyds 
Banking Group First a Total of £28,038,800 for Serious Sales Incentive Failings 
(Nov. 12, 2013), available at http://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-fines-
lloyds-banking-group-firms-for-serious-sales-incentive-failings; Final Notice from 
Fin. Conduct Auth. to Lloyds TSB Bank plc and Bank of Scotland plc (Dec. 10, 
2013), available at http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/final-
notices/2013/lloyds-tsb-bank-and-bank-of-scotland. 
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this programme, A&L undertook, amongst other things, to contact all 
customers that purchased PPI in conjunction with an unsecured loan, to 
review its policy in respect of product information that was sent to these 
customers, to review any rejected complaints and claims, and to pay redress 
where appropriate.  A&L demonstrates that, at least in theory, the 
regulator’s enforcement strategy goes beyond penalizing unacceptable 
forms of business conduct.  The offender’s failure to comply with TCF is 
seen as an opportunity for the offender to reflect on what went wrong and 
make things right by taking remedial action, revising processes, practices, 
and ultimately its corporate culture.41 This approach survived the upheaval 
of regulatory reform in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis and it is 
now crystallised in various dispute resolution provisions of the FCA 
Handbook. Accordingly, it remains a key element of the regulator’s 
strategy.42 
                                                                                                                                      
41 See Howard Becker, Culture: A Sociological View, 71 YALE REV. 513 
(1982) (describing culture as shared understandings that permit a group of people 
to act in concert with each other); Roger Cotterrell, Law and Culture – Inside and 
Beyond the National State, 31 NORDIC J.L. & JUST. 23, 23–36 (2008) (Nor.) 
(identifying four cultural components namely ‘beliefs/values’, ‘traditions’, 
‘instrumental matters’ (economic, technological) and ‘matters of effect’ 
(emotions)); Justin O’Brien et al., Culture and the Future of Financial Regulation: 
How to Embed Restraint in the Interests of Systemic Stability, 8 L. & FIN. 
MARKETS REV. 115, 126 (2014) (identifying five sources of cultures); Jasper 
Sorensen, The Strength of Corporate Culture and Reliability of Firm Performance, 
47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 70, 72 (2002) (offering a narrow definition of culture as a 
system of shared values). 
42 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 31, at 2, 4 (2014) (reflecting the 
recommendations made by the FSA in FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE ASSESSMENT AND 
REDRESS OF PAYMENT PROTECTION INSURANCE COMPLAINTS (2009)); FIN. SERVS. 
AUTH., THE ASSESSMENT AND REDRESS OF PAYMENT PROTECTION INSURANCE 
COMPLAINTS §§ 3.26, 4.7 (2009), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp09_23.pdf (recommending firms to proactively 
reassess all complaints and consider whether a wider redress programme would be 
appropriate, namely one which would include the proactive redress of PPI 
customers who have not complained); H. Osborne, PPI Mis-Selling: Banks to 
Write to up to 12 Million Customers, GUARDIAN (March 6, 2012), 
http://www.theguardian.com/money/2012/mar/06/ppi-misselling-banks-write-
customers. 
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In implementing the TCF agenda, the FCA is further assisted by 
the Financial Ombudsman Service (“FOS”).43 Although it is not the 
purpose of this Article to examine the powers and role of the FOS as a 
guardian of best practice in the retail financial sector, it is important to note 
that its involvement goes beyond dispute resolution and consumer redress. 
FOS decisions are instrumental in the cultivation of a common 
understanding of what TCF entails in practice.  They inform the 
interpretation of TCF requirements and, in the long run, they provide 
guidance on the expected level of performance in delivering fair treatment 
to customers.  
Several considerations informed the decision of the UK regulator 
to implement TCF.44 As with any other typical scheme of management-
based regulation, TCF embraces self-regulation.  This makes it morally 
appealing because it subscribes to a vision of the regulatory community, 
the members of which are assumed to be capable of working out for 
themselves the public standards that ought to govern their relationships.  
Self-regulation also tends to create a sense of legitimacy, as it bears out 
standards of conduct that are made by the industry and for the industry, 
albeit under the watchful eye and quasi-approval of the regulator.  
The management-based and performance-oriented elements in TCF 
also have the potential to tackle a series of persistent problems that are 
associated with the old-school ‘command and control’ regulation.  
Examples include those of creative compliance, the cost of rulemaking and 
enforcement, lack of flexibility, and problems of over and under 
inclusiveness.45 As the argument goes, the articulation of a specific set of 
outcomes helps firms concentrate on what matters, namely performance in 
delivering certain goals rather than sticking to the letter of the law.  The 
informal means of communicating the regulator’s TCF expectations are 
                                                                                                                                      
43 In the past, FOS alerted the UK regulator about emerging trends concerning 
poor standards of conduct of business practices and the case for regulatory action. 
See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., COMPLAINT HANDLING PROCEDURES OF THE FINANCIAL 
OMBUDSMAN SERVICE (2014), available at 
http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/DISP/3. 
44 See Georgosouli, supra note 36, at 417–420, for a more detailed discussion. 
45 On the limitations of rules as instruments of social organisation and control 
see generally JULIA BLACK, RULES AND REGULATORS ch. 1 (1997); Colin Diver, 
The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983) 
(approaching the matter from a law and economics perspective); Doug McBarnet 
& Christopher Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the Struggle 
for Legal Control, 54 M.L.R. 848 (1991). 
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also thought to be more flexible and less time consuming. Moreover, they 
arguably place the regulator in a better position to obtain crucial and timely 
information that is essential for the formation of judgments with respect to 
compliance, the expediency of enforcement action, and even the case for 
reform. 
TCF also affords a more participatory and discursive approach to 
regulation. The latter carries with it the promise of being more effective in 
aligning the industry’s perceptions with the goals and views of the 
regulator.46 As the argument goes, long-term cultural change is more likely 
to happen with industry engagement, not least because in this manner, the 
regulatees are expected to become more cognizant of their responsibilities 
in delivering TCF outcomes and also more sophisticated in sensing what 
TCF requires even in the presence of new or unforeseen circumstances.  
Moreover, regulatees who are given the chance to decide how best to 
proceed in their attempt to incorporate TCF into their business culture are 
more likely to view it as reasonable and thus worthy of compliance.  
Finally, by granting firms the flexibility to develop their own strategies, 
TCF enables firms to experiment and seek out better and more innovative 
solutions. 
Finally, there are several advantages to note in relation to the 
FCA’s policy of reactive intervention in the context of the TCF initiative.  
The desirability of enforcement action is assessed in light of its likely 
impact on the industry’s capacity to develop patterns of self-regulation.  It 
is forward-looking in the sense that it aims to educate the regulated 
industry and to encourage a change of culture.47 Being partly premised on 
negotiation, the enforcement procedure itself creates opportunities for the 
alleged offender to deliberate with the regulator, become cognizant of its 
failure to comply, remedy any wrongdoing, and revise its business practice 
where appropriate. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
46  See Black, supra note 45, at 37–44, for a classic exposition of the nature of 
conversational regulation. See also Andromachi Georgosouli, Regulatory 
Interpretation: Conversational or Constructive?, 30 O.J.L.S. 361, 361–84 (2010), 
for a critical evaluation of the view of regulation as conversational. 
47 See Sorensen, supra note 41, at 15. 
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IV.  TRACING THE CAUSES OF THE TCF FAILURE TO DETER 
PPI MIS-SELLING 
 
A.   THE RULIFICATION OF TCF 
 
In its original inception, TCF departs from the traditional rulebook 
approach.  It seems to be based on the belief that, in the absence of rules, 
problems like, for example, that of legal uncertainty – vanish automatically. 
However, the reality is different.  Legal certainty may no longer be a 
function of the design of rules, but it is certainly contingent to the informal 
means through which regulatory expectations are communicated.  Judging 
from past experience, the text of these informal means of communication is 
no less authoritative than the content of the FCA Handbook.  In the case of 
TCF, informal communication failed to convey with clarity the regulator’s 
expectations. 48 
One would expect that the informal and flexible nature of TCF 
would compensate for the perceived legal uncertainty surrounding its 
implementation, but this is not what happened.  By and large, firms have 
been reluctant to take initiative and exercise the level of discretion that was 
delegated to them.  They preferred more detailed regulatory guidance.  
Conversely, when they did exercise discretion, the outcomes were not to 
the regulator’s satisfaction.  In view of this, TCF soon evolved into a 
rulified regime.49
 
The response of the UK regulator was a conspicuous 
proliferation of detailed and legally binding rules and guidance.  In 2007, in 
particular, and after repeated failings to combat misconduct, the UK 
regulator introduced more detailed ICOBS rules50 in the name of clarity 
and certainty.
51
At the same time though, it continued to communicate its 
expectations regarding TCF through informal guidance.  
Indeed, the UK regulator did not give up the idea of self-regulation 
as the main conduit of change in the business culture of retail firms.  In this 
spirit, it reassured the industry that the changes in the ICOBS did not 
amount to a ‘command and control’ approach and that informal 
communications and non-legally binding guidance would continue to be 
                                                                                                                                      
48 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 32. 
49 See Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of 
Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803 (2004), for a general discussion. 
50 See supra pp. 7-8 (discussing new ICOB rules). 
51 See infra pp. 20–24 where formal enforcement is discussed in the context of 
credible deterrence. 
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relied upon. This was thought appropriate to allow for a degree of 
flexibility that would make possible for firms to develop patterns of self-
regulation, however, legal uncertainty remained an issue.52 So did the 
firms’ reluctance to commit to the ideal of self-regulation.53 
 
B.   TCF AND THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF ‘BIG DATA’ 
 
The implementation of TCF requires increasing capacity to collect 
and process data, as, for example, for the purposes of managing emerging 
risks as a preventive measure, or for the purposes of effective enforcement.  
The UK regulator recommends the Management Information (“MI”) 
framework as a tool for the management and processing of data.54 
Essentially, MI standardises the process of collecting information during a 
period of business activity with respect to key issues that are of relevance 
to TCF.  It makes it easier for managers to put information in perspective 
and align it with the regulator’s expectations.  Furthermore, the data 
collected serves as evidence of the firm’s capacity to meet performance 
targets.  
The data that is produced and accumulated at the level of each 
regulated firm is then fed into the regulatory system via GABRIEL 
(Gathering Better Regulatory Information Electronically).55 The latter is an 
online reporting platform for the collection, validation and storage of data.  
The nature of the data that a firm is expected to report to the FCA via 
GABRIEL varies.  In any case, it depends on the regulated activities that 
the firm undertakes and the prudential category into which the firm is 
classified.  GABRIEL makes a special reporting provision for PPI related 
data.  This signifies the importance of data collection and processing as a 
necessary precondition for the timely identification of TCF-related risks 
and, where appropriate, for the taking of disciplinary action.   
Although, both the MI and the special PPI reporting through 
GABRIEL are welcome developments, they are subject to limitations. 
There is no doubt that MI makes it easier for firms to deal with a tangible 
problem, that of information management and the associated cost of 
                                                                                                                                      
52 See Andromachi Georgosouli, Judgment-led Regulation: Reflections on 
Data and Discretion, 14 J.B.R. 209, 210 (2013).  
53 See infra p. 24. 
54 The FSA introduced the MI framework. FIN. SERVS AUTH., supra note 32, 4.  
55 See generally GABRIEL, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Aug. 26, 2014), 
http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/systems-reporting/gabriel. 
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processing an ever-growing volume of information.56 However, this is as 
far as it goes.  MI cannot guarantee the reliability of the data that is made 
available to the regulator.  The data that is eventually channelled through 
the regulator’s system of decision-making is as good as the data produced 
at regulated firm level. 
As we learn from empirical studies on the use of big data by the 
medical professions in the US, there are several pitfalls and shortcomings 
in the process of electronic reporting.57 Apart from errors due to software 
failures, problems may occur as a result of typing quickly, ticking the 
wrong boxes, or copying and pasting out-dated or otherwise wrong 
information.58 To the extent that the reporting forms allow for the addition 
of free text, contradictions may also occur between the content of the free 
text and the content of the standard text.  There is no reason to think that 
the electronic reporting systems that are currently deployed by the industry 
and the FCA are immune from shortcomings like those reported in the 
medical profession. 
The accumulated data is the product of self-assessment exercises, 
which are riddled with human bias.  For example, firm employees are 
unlikely to disclose non-favourable information, especially when there is a 
little chance that the regulator will ever find out about this.59 Similarly, they 
are unlikely to pass on information that is harmful to them or their fellows.  
Human judgement is also subject to “automation” bias namely the tendency 
to disregard information which contradicts information that is generally 
accepted as correct.60 Last but not least, the reward and incentive structure 
                                                                                                                                      
56 See, however, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, INTELLIGENT MANAGEMENT 
AND COMPLIANCE COST REDUCTION 10–12 (2008) (demonstrating that 
management-based regulation is expensive in its implementation).  
57 See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgorski, The Use of Biomedical 
Data: Is Bigger Really Better? 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 497, 499–502 (2013). 
Nevertheless, the authors point out that digitalization can prevent some data quality 
problems, such as those associated with illegible handwriting. 
58 Id. at 515–16, 519–20. 
59 See John C. Coffee Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical 
View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 
1099, 1146, 1242 (1977). 
60 See generally Steven T. Schwarcz & David E. Wallin, Behavioural 
Implications of Information Systems on Disclosure Fraud, 14 BEHAV. RES. IN 
ACCT. 197 (2002) (arguing that the use of computer data increases the likelihood 
of this pattern of behaviour). 
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of firms gives rise to another type of bias namely, the “self-serving bias”.61 
This describes the tendency to interpret ambiguous information in a manner 
that is favourable to one’s self.  
The quality of information may be further compromised due to 
certain structural features of the electronic reporting system – most notably 
that of data fragmentation.  In the case under examination, it is interesting 
to note, for example, that the special PPI reporting requirement applies only 
to those firms that have been asked to provide monthly data on specific PPI 
management information.62 The rest must follow the usual path and submit 
electronically information that is classified as data pertaining to product 
sales, complaints handling, etc. This differential treatment that is reflected 
in terms of ‘who’ is to submit PPI-related data makes sense especially 
when seeing through the lens of risk-based regulation, according to which 
resources should be directed in priority to the monitoring of those firms 
that pose a higher risk to the delivery of TCF outcomes.  However, this 
approach can be problematic.  
Data that is submitted for the purposes of reporting on product 
sales and complaints handling can also be PPI-sensitive despite the fact that 
it is not earmarked as such at the time of its submission to GABRIEL.  
Accordingly, a danger here is that its PPI-relevance will escape the 
regulator’s attention.  There is an additional issue of concern here.  Due to 
its structural features, GABRIEL is bound to produce more data for those 
firms that are already put under the spotlight because they present a higher 
risk of failure to meet TCF targets.  Conversely, GABRIEL is expected to 
produce less data for the purposes of proactive intervention and in 
particular with respect to lower risk retail financial services providers 
whose business culture may nevertheless call for attention as it may not be 
compatible with TCF goals in the long run.  The suboptimal production of 
data for the purposes of proactive intervention is not a trivial matter. It is 
liable to undermine the regulator’s attempt to map out the prevailing 
business culture of the firm in question accurately and to decide appropriate 
course of action in a timely fashion. 
                                                                                                                                      
61 See generally Jeffrey Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for 
Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1172–73 (2003) (offering a classification of 
various types of self-serving bias). 
62 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., PAYMENT PROTECTION INSURANCE (PPI) REPORTING 
FORM (2014), available at http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/systems-reporting/ppi-
reporting-forms.  
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The UK regulator has not done enough to put in place inter-
operable data systems and take steps to ensure that collected data is 
integrated into a single data. This could ameliorate the difficulties that are 
associated with data fragmentation.63 For example, the so-called Integrated 
Regulatory Reporting (“IRR”) does not serve as a universally integrated 
system of data resource management.64 It does harmonize inconsistent 
reporting formats, but its scope of application is very limited.  On the one 
hand, it is calibrated to comply with the transparency requirements of the 
Capital Requirements Directive (“CRD”) and the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (“MiFID”).65 On the other hand, it applies to a very 
specific group of regulated firms, namely investment management firms, 
securities and futures firms, and firms that enter into regulated mortgage 
contracts or administer regulated mortgage contracts.66  
The problem of data fragmentation is further exacerbated by the 
fact that the FCA and the PRA collect data separately.67 Although the two 
regulators are expected to share information along the lines of a 
Memorandum of Understanding, delays and turf wars cannot be precluded 
over sensitive information.68 Furthermore, the two regulators may not 
necessarily share the same view when they assess whether a piece of 
information should be brought to the attention of the other regulator in the 
first place or as a matter of priority. 
                                                                                                                                      
63 See generally Hoffman & Podgorski, supra note 57, at 517–518 (discussing 
the harms and causes of incomplete or fragmented data). 
64 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FCA-PRA COMBINED HANDBOOK § 16.12 (2014), 
available at http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/SUP/16/12 (making IRR 
mandatory); see also CPAAUDIT LLP, GUIDE TO INTEGRATED REGULATORY 
REPORTING (RII) AND MANDATORY ELECTRONIC REPORTING (MER) FOR 
INVESTMENT FIRMS (2008), available at 
http://www.cpaaudit.co.uk/pdfs/IRRandMERGuide.pdf. 
65 See Rebecca Atkinson, FSA Issues Integrated Regulatory Reporting Paper, 
MORTGAGE STRATEGY (June 1, 2006), http://www.mortgagestrategy. co.uk/isa-
issues-integrated-regulatory-reporting-paper/123106.article. 
66 See CPA AUDIT LLP, supra note 64, at 1. 
67 HM TREASURY, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU): BETWEEN THE 
FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY (FCA) AND THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION 
AUTHORITY (PRA) (Apr. 22, 2013), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
publications/memorandum-of-understanding-between-the-financial-conduct-authority-
and-the-bank-of-england-including-the-prudential-regulation-authority. 
68 See generally Georgosouli, supra note 14, 63–66, for a critical evaluation of 
the FCA and PRA coordination arrangements under the Financial Services Act 
2012. 
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An integral aspect of the creation of computer software is the 
reduction of regulatory commands into code. The latter poses a range of 
challenges.  The code is bound to reflect the professional programmers’ 
beliefs about how TCF should be interpreted in practice. When these 
beliefs are not consistent with those of the regulator, there is a risk that 
firms end up using computer software (e.g. computer software that supports 
a firm’s system of data resource management pertaining to TCF) whose 
code encapsulates an understanding of TCF that may actually be words 
apart from that which was originally envisaged by the regulator.  As a 
result of this incompatibility, important risks are unlikely to be detected or 
indeed properly identified and responded to.  
In view of this problem, one would expect that at least some form 
of quasi-monitoring be in place at the production stage of computer 
software so that a minimum calibration and compatibility is secured.  This 
would also keep at bay several inconsistencies and unnecessary 
discrepancies in the design of the code, however, at the moment, the FCA 
goes as far as to provide a list of Independent Software Vendors (“ISVs”) 
for the purpose of assisting the industry in finding software suppliers.  
Moreover, and in order to avoid any misconception to the contrary, this list 
is followed with a disclaimer that the “FCA does not endorse or 
recommend any ISV listed.”69  
 
C.   TCF AND THE DESIDERATUM OF CREDIBLE DETERRENCE 
 
Credible deterrence requires enforcement action that is visible 
enough so that wrongdoers realise that they face a real risk of being held 
accountable and of bearing the tangible consequences of disciplinary 
action.70 The UK regulator did not always give emphasis to formal 
enforcement as a tool for credible deterrence.71  
Pre-crisis, the motto was “prevention is better than cure.”  Initially, 
the FSA relied on a combination of principles and rules in order to regulate 
                                                                                                                                      
69 Independent Software Vendors, FIN. SERVS. AUTH. (Jul. 11, 2014), 
http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/systems-reporting/gabriel/tech-publications/list-of-
isvs. 
70 Howard Rockness & Joanne Rockness, Legislated Ethics: from Enron to 
Sarbanes-Oxley, the Impact of Corporate America, 57 J. BUS. ETHICS 21, 50–51 
(2005) (highlighting the need for meaningful sanctions and fines that exceed 
gains). 
71 Ferran, supra note 6, at 260–61. 
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the sale of PPI ranging from the Eleven High Level Principles for Business 
(“PRIN”) to rules on systems and controls (“SYSC”), training and 
competence (“TC”), and rules on how to handle customer complaints 
(“DISP”). Eventually, these were further supplemented by a more detailed 
version of the ICOBS.  The legal enforcement of these rules was not at the 
top of the priorities of the UK regulator.  The emphasis was on persuasion 
and the industry was expected to voluntarily adhere to Handbook 
provisions.  The industry’s enrolment was viewed as key to proactive 
regulation and self-regulation was relied upon as the main conduit of 
cultural change.  The fact that the FSA’s policy of deterrence was not 
enforcement-led does not mean that enforcement was missing.  Even in the 
early years, enforcement –for example, through the imposition of 
administrative fines- had a role to play in sending the message that non-
compliance would not be tolerated, but it was clearly employed as a last 
resort.72 
Post-crisis, and after an increasing number of instances of financial 
misselling, the FSA became concerned that its enforcement strategy was 
neither preventive nor visible enough to change industry attitudes.73 The 
probability of enforcement was not considered a credible threat as much as 
a consideration that it would make firms think twice before breaking the 
rules.74 Scepticism also started to grow about the extent to which it is 
                                                                                                                                      
72 See generally Margaret Cole, Dir. of Enforcement, Fin. Servs. Auth., Annual 
Financial Crimes Conference: Delivering Credible Deterrence (Apr. 27, 2009), 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/ 
Speeches/2009/0427_mc.shtml; Margaret Cole, Dir. of Enforcement, Fin. Servs. Auth., 
Enforcement Law Conference: How Enforcement Makes a Difference (June 18, 2008), 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2008/ 
0618_mc.shtml. 
73 See Letter from Andrew Tyrie, Member of Parliament, U.K., to Fin. 
Ombudsman Serv. (Dec. 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/treasury/121 219-
FOS-PPI-capacity-planning.pdf; see also NICK WAUGH & CHRISTIE SILK, THE 
COST OF REDRESS: THE LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE PPI MIS-SELLING 
SCANDAL 8 (2014), available at http://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/index/ 
policy/policy_publications/er_consumertravelandtransport/the_cost_of_redress.ht
m. 
74 See Tracey McDermott, Dir. of Enforcement & Fin. Crime, Fin. Conduct 
Auth., Enforcement and Credible Deterrence in the FCA, Address at the Thompson 
Reuters Compliance and Risk Summit, at 3–5, 7–8 (clarifying that the regulator’s 
role is to test and challenge assertions about what the culture of an institution is) 
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feasible to attune business culture to the delivery of public policy goals and 
to foster patterns of self-governance in an industry that was demonstrably 
hostile to self-regulation.  In view of this, the FSA introduced a new 
strategy.  This made its first appearance in the FSA 2007/8 Annual Report 
and was labelled “credible deterrence” to mark a toughening up of the 
regulator’s enforcement action.75  
The FCA continues this approach, but also enjoys more powers to 
become a credible enforcer of TCF.76 As pointed out above, the parent 
legislation now entrusts the FCA with enhanced powers to use transparency 
as an enforcement tool in the sense that it is now possible for the regulator 
to publish information about a disciplinary action at an earlier stage than in 
the past provided that certain conditions are met.77 Product intervention is 
another key element of the new strategy.  At least on paper the FCA has 
more interventionist powers at its disposal under new sections 137C to 
137D and 137M to 137N of the FSMA 2000 as recently amended by the 
FSA 2012.78 These are further complemented by new sections 137P to 
137Q, which set out more powers to intervene in respect of financial 
promotions.79  
                                                                                                                                      
(June 18, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.fca.org.uk/static/ 
documents/enforcement-credible-deterrence-speech.pdf). 
75 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT, 2007-8, H.C., at 6 (U.K.). 
76 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY: APPROACH TO 
REGULATION 25 (2011). 
77 Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 391 (U.K.) (amended 
2010). Section 391 incorporates further extension of transparency-enhancing 
changes made by the Financial Services Act 2010. Id. The FSA’s use of these 
powers has already been challenged by way of judicial review and in the Upper 
Tribunal. See R ex rel. S v. X, [2011] EWHC (Admin) 1645, [4]–[10] (Eng.) 
(addressing the claimant’s appeal of the FSA’s decision notice to the Upper 
Tribunal and granting an interim injunction to restrain the FSA from publishing the 
notice); R ex rel. Can. Inc. v. Fin. Servs. Auth., [2011] EHWC (Admin) 2766 
(Eng.). 
78 Financial Services Act, 2012, c. 21, § 137C–137D, 137M–137N (U.K).  
79 Some of the FCA’s key priorities in respect to consumer credit reveal the 
intention of the UK regulator to make use of its new powers. These priorities 
include (a) the review of financial promotions, (b) the improvement of debt 
management standards, (c) considering the introduction of price caps on what 
payday lenders can actually charge, (d) assessing regularly how the industry treats 
financial difficulties, and (e) getting a better understanding of the economic 
behavior of consumers. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., BUSINESS PLAN 2014/15 (2014), 
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Firms are still required to demonstrate an ongoing commitment, 
right up to the board level, in securing right outcomes for their customers, 
particularly consumers.80 Furthermore, senior managers that repeatedly fail 
to deliver now face greater chances of becoming the target of the FCA’s 
enforcement action.81 Last but not least, there is now the possibility of mass 
consumer redress, the aim of which is to ensure consistent redress 
outcomes for consumers in a timelier fashion.82 
There is no doubt that these amendments to the TCF legal 
framework bear the potential of cementing the FCA’s enforcement action if 
indeed the FCA decides to move from simply expressing intentions to the 
taking of action. Nevertheless, the fact remains that post-crisis, visibility of 
enforcement action of the UK regulator is still lacking.  Although it is true 
that we witnessed a peak in formal enforcement between 2006 and 2008, it 
is equally true that enforcement action regarding PPI tailed off more 
recently, given that the regulator’s priority remains that of securing redress 
for the numerous victims of PPI misselling rather than to punish 
wrongdoers for their misconduct.83 Formal enforcement is still considered a 
measure of last resort while dialogue and persuasion continue to be the 
preferred course of action for behaviour modification.84 There is a good 
reason for this.  Formal enforcement takes time to bring fruits let alone 
secure large-scale consumer redress.  In a similar fashion, early settlement 
is thought to be in the public interest because it secures redress for the 
victims of PPI misselling, and it is speedier and less expensive relative to 
other alternatives. 
                                                                                                                                      
available at http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/ corporate/business-plan-
2014-2015.pdf. 
80 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., TREATING CUSTOMERS FAIRLY: PROGRESS UPDATE 15 
(2008), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/ tcf_progress.pdf. 
81 McDermott, supra note 74, at 5–7. 
82 Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, §§ 404-404G (U.K.) 
(amended 2010); Richard Peat et al., Imposing Consumer Redress Schemes, 32 
COMPANY LAW. 183 (2011).  
83 See Financial Services and Markets Act § 2(2) (providing that the primary 
regulatory objectives include the protection of consumers); see Patrick Collinson, 
Ombudsman Still Receiving 1,000 Complaints a Day on PPI Mis-Selling, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/money/ 
2014/mar/04/ombudsman-receives-1000-ppi-misselling-complaints (indicating a 
steep drop in number of enforcement cases for PPI misselling). 
84 See generally Financial Services and Markets Act §§ 225–34 (providing a 
mechanism for adjudication of certain disputes with “minimum formality”).  
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The credibility of enforcement also calls for consistent policy.  
Otherwise it is difficult for the regulator to convey the seriousness of its 
intention.  Experience in the UK suggests that the intensity of enforcement 
action varies and that it is by and large driven by the prevailing political 
climate.  For example, the FSA’s willingness to proceed to formal 
enforcement gained momentum during the recent financial turmoil, that is 
to say, at a time when there has been great political pressure to bring cases 
to court.  As collective memory of the financial crisis of 2008 fades away, 
the regulator’s commitment to formal enforcement is expected to recede.  
The possibility of early settlement and the tendency to resort to 
private warnings at the supervisory stage and in exclusion from any further 
enforcement action are two further features of the UK regulator’s approach 
that undermine the visibility of disciplinary action. Specifically, under the 
current regime, the industry is given several incentives to opt for early 
settlement, such as discounts and the reduction of financial penalties.85 The 
downside of this is that nobody takes notice given that these early stages of 
disciplinary action are carried out away from the public eye.  Private 
warnings at the supervisory stage are arguably the most serious form of 
reprimand during ongoing supervisory correspondence.  They 
communicate the regulator’s concerns about the firm’s conduct and that 
disciplinary action may follow as a result of this, but again this 
correspondence is kept confidential and may never materialise into a 
widely publicized formal enforcement action.  
The credibility of deterrence practices of the UK regulators has 
been further eroded by the industry’s reluctance to genuinely engage with 
the regulator to secure fair treatment for customers.86 This is evident, for 
example, (a) in the large number of PPI complaints being referred to the 
FOS, (b) in the discrepancy in outcomes between PPI complaints that were 
referred to the FOS and those that were handled by firms87 and (c) more 
recently, in the industry’s attempt to challenge the FSA’s decision to take 
                                                                                                                                      
85 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., DECISION PROCEDURE AND PENALTIES MANUAL § 
6.7 (2014), available at http://media.fshandbook.info/content/FCA/ DEPP.pdf. For 
information on the discount rates, see id. 
86 See Final Notice from the Fin. Servs. Auth. to the Co-operative Bank PLC 
(Jan. 4, 2013), available at http://www.fca.org.uk/static/ fca/documents/final-
notices/co-op.pdf; Lloyds TSB Bank Plc, supra note 6. See also McDermott, supra 
note 74 (discussing this erosion). 
87 See Collinson, supra note 83 (noting the increased flow of PPI complaints 
that was referred to the FOS); Ferran, supra note 6 at pages 252 and 255 
(discussing the dismissiveness of the industry).  
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enforcement action following the industry’s failure to take into account 
FOS decisions in handling customer complaints, contrary to the regulator’s 
expectations, as these were communicated informally in a Policy Statement 
(“PS”).88  
In its judicial review action the industry argued that PRIN are not 
actionable by suit by a private person in view of the wording of old section 
150 of the FSMA 2000.89 Accordingly, they could not give rise to redress 
obligations.  In addition, the industry claimed that regulatory principles 
could not conflict with or augment specific rules.90 Finally, it contended 
that the existence of an alternative statutory collective redress scheme 
precluded the FSA from taking the action that was set out in the Policy 
Statement.91 The industry eventually lost its case on all three grounds.92  In 
the course of bringing the action, several firms put on hold the handling of 
nearly all PPI complaints.  This caused significant delays in the system, 
eventually leading to the large pay-outs in the second term of 2011.93 Most 
importantly though, it aggravated the situation in the eyes of the UK 
regulator and undermined past attempts to build trust. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The principle that customers must be treated fairly has a long 
history in the UK.  So does the problem of PPI misselling, which the 
Treating Customers Fairly initiative aims to tackle.  I tried to demonstrate 
in this Article that TCF looks good on paper. It intends to be flexible 
enough to let firms adapt regulatory mandates according to their individual 
circumstances and it encourages firms to develop their self-regulatory 
capacities in a manner that bolsters TCF targets, namely tangible public 
policy outcomes.  However, in practice, the recurring instances of PP 
misselling indicate that TCF has, thus far, made little difference.  
                                                                                                                                      
88 R ex rel. British Bankers Ass’n v. Fin. Servs. Auth., [2011] EWHC (Admin) 
999. 
89 Id. at [60].  
90 Id. at [95]. 
91 Id. at [210]–[211]. 
92 Id. at [264]. 
93 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 42; Press Release, Fin. Servs. Auth., Lloyds 
Banking Grp. Fined £4.3 Million for Delayed PPI Redress Payments (Feb. 19, 
2013), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/ 
pr/2013/017.shtml. 
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This Article traced the causes of this shortcoming, focusing in 
particular on the rulification of TCF, some difficulties associated with the 
system of data resource management that is currently in use, and the 
absence of a system of credible deterrence to back up the regulator’s 
attempt to inflict long-term cultural change in the interests of consumers.  
Several lessons may be drawn from the UK experience with TCF.  All of 
them illustrate that the focus on “outcomes” rather than “principles” does 
not necessary guarantee better performance in attaining public policy 
objectives.   
For a start, the implementation of TCF in the UK demonstrates that 
the choice to depart from the traditional rulebook approach does not 
necessarily offer a better solution to the pervasive problem of striking the 
proper balance between, on the one hand, certainty and predictability and, 
on the other hand, flexibility and adaptability.  TCF was informal in its 
inception, but eventually it became rulified and sclerotic, in view of the 
measures that were taken to respond to the industry’s constant pressure for 
more detailed guidance.  
Further, the regime of intensive supervision that has been 
associated with the implementation of the rulified TCF is likely to have 
contributed to the regulatees’ general reluctance to exercise judgement and 
discretion and to adopt an attitude of reflective compliance with rules and 
guidance.  Instead of being “enabling” and “engaging,” in all probability 
the regulator’s near omnipresence in the internal affairs of the regulated 
firms left hardly any scope for reflection and healthy experimentation and 
made the regulatees either more complacent or less confident in their 
expertise and judgement. 
The UK experience with the implementation of TCF also 
highlights the relevance of big data in making the whole initiative a 
success.  Specifically, it reveals how the computer software that supports 
data resource management can actually hinder regulators from making 
sound judgments. This occurs when the software is not properly designed 
or when errors, undermining the reliability and accuracy of the data 
produced, are not identified and properly addressed at an early stage.  Who 
develops computer software for data resource management is also of 
practical importance.  Professional programmers do not necessarily 
understand what TCF requires in practice in the same way as the regulator 
does.  To the extent in which the articulation of TCF outcomes may turn 
out to be different from what was originally intended, computer software 
that is specifically calibrated to ensure compliance with TCF may in reality 
be at odds with the intended TCF goals. 
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In view of the fact that technology shapes the meaning of TCF 
goals and may even translate TCF goals into a course of action that is 
worlds apart from what the regulator would recommend, some further 
issues that require immediate attention include, but are not limited to, the 
following: (a) The determination of the respective roles of the State and the 
market in developing the software that would support the operationalization 
of a consolidated system of data resource management; (b) whether some 
sort of a licensing regime would be appropriate as a mechanism that would 
ensure consistency between the regulator’s understanding of TCF and that 
of software developers’; (c) how to make sure that the relevant software is 
constantly updated so that it keeps pace with market developments; (d) 
whether it is desirable to have in place inter-operable data systems with 
means for monitoring and correcting data errors built into them (e.g., 
automatic alerts regarding the entry of anomalous values); and (e) whether 
it is expedient to standardize terms and industry jargon. 
Finally, the lack of credible deterrence brings to the surface an 
inevitable trade off between two conflicting policy considerations that 
cannot be ignored: on the one hand, the need to secure timely and cost-
efficient consumer redress and, on the other, the need to ensure that law 
enforcement is visible enough to deter. The UK experience highlights that 
it is not possible to have both.  While securing financial redress in a timely 
fashion justifies early settlement, credible deterrence pulls in the opposite 
direction because it calls for a course of action that is more time consuming 
(typically this would involve bringing a case to the courts) and a gamble to 
retail customers.   
The increasing emphasis on business culture suggests that the FCA 
is cognisant of this trade off and that it has made a deliberate choice to 
boost market discipline by challenging the business culture that prevails in 
the industry.  This is a welcome development, but it will take time to bring 
fruits.  In any case, the potency of culture as a regulatory tool should not be 
blown out of proportion.  
At least in part, the efficacy of the regulator to instigate cultural 
change depends on the willingness of the firms to genuinely engage with 
the regulator and – when challenged – to reflect on the soundness of their 
respective culture in order to amend business practices where appropriate.  
Persistent industry regression leaves little scope for optimism.  In this 
regard, it is interesting to note that in the past the policy of the FSA was to 
offer firms a “regulatory dividend” in the form of less scrutiny, as an 
incentive to make them behave well demonstrating essentially that 
customer interests were central to the corporate culture of the business in 
question.  This policy reflected an assumption that the vast majority of 
288 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 21.1 
 
firms had the intention to treat their customers fairly and that the majority 
were willing to engage openly and positively with the regulator.  Both 
assumptions proved to be naïve in reality.  
Retail financial firms are not charities working in the interests of 
customers.  They are profit-driven institutions.  A business culture that ends 
up reflecting both the profit-driven character of the business and the firm’s 
perceived commitment to public policy goals, like fair treatment for 
customers, is bound to be self-defeating because it constitutes a 
contradiction in terms.  One must take priority, and quite intuitively this 
will have to be profit.  Otherwise, the business will not be able to survive.  
This is not to say that no good can come out of business culture as a tool 
for improving the effectiveness of TCF. It can, but in all probability, it is 
going to be less than we are inclined to think.  Profit-making considerations 
confine how far TCF can go in aligning the goals and priorities of the 
industry with those of the regulator and, by implication, to what extent it is 
possible to rely on business culture.  Accordingly, when designing and 
implementing TCF, a healthy dose of pragmatism is called for to make it a 
credible policy in the first place. 
 
